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Much upper echelons research focuses on the effect of CEO experience on firm performance outcomes.  This paper 
extends this research stream using human and social capital theories as a framework to examine the effect of CEO 
experience on the performance of large diversified companies.  Our analysis of 239 Fortune “500” companies finds that 
larger companies are more likely to select insiders and individuals who have more firm-specific experience to be their 
CEO.  We also find that the selection of insiders and CEOs with more firm-specific experience is associated with 
significantly higher firm performance.  These findings highlight the importance of the human and social capital 
possessed by company insiders, and shed additional light on the strategic leadership of large diversified companies and 
other complex organizations. 
 
Upper echelons research emphasizes the value of the 
human and social capital provided by firms’ CEOs and other 
top managers (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Castanias & Helfat, 
1991).  Some scholars claim that the human and social 
capital contributed by top executives may be a firm’s most 
important and enduring source of competitive advantage 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 2000; Moran, 2005).  Yet, more 
than 50 specific studies examining the influence of CEO 
background on firm performance have produced few 
consistent findings (Karaevli, 2007).  In reviewing this 
literature, Karaevli attributes the disparity in research 
findings to the use of unsophisticated measures of CEO 
background and to a lack of appreciation for the importance 
of organizational context, and she urges researchers to adopt 
more refined measures of CEO origin and to give more 
attention to the importance of contextual factors. 
This paper builds on these ideas and suggestions by 
incorporating key insights from the human and social capital 
literature, and by employing a new, more refined measure of 
CEO experience.  We also examine the influence of CEO 
experience in the specific and important context of large 
diversified firms because human and social capital are likely 
to be especially valuable resources that play a key role in the 
effective management of these complex organizations.  We 
begin by reviewing the literature on executive experience, 
focusing on the executive succession literature, research on 
the management of diversification, and the literature on 
human and social capital.  We use insights from these 
literature streams to develop a rationale for selecting 
company insiders and those with more firm-specific 
experience to be the CEOs of large diversified firms.  We 
then empirically examine whether these firms are more 
likely than their smaller and less diversified counterparts to 
select insider CEOs, and whether insider CEOs and those 
with more firm-specific experience are associated with 
higher firm performance. 
 
BACKGROUND AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Firms are much more inclined to hire insiders than 
outsiders as CEO.  For many years, researchers at Booz 
Allen Hamilton have been tracking succession patterns in 
2,500 large firms, and find that outsider CEOs tend to be 
hired in only 20 to 30 percent of all successions, though this 
percentage can vary considerably from year to year (Lucier, 
Kocourek, & Habber, 2006). 
Many factors explain why insiders have an edge in CEO 
selection, but nearly all of the factors are consistent with 
human and social capital perspectives.  For example, 
insiders are likely to have an advantage in understanding 
their company’s competitive landscape and its strategic 
position (Shen & Cannella, 2002).  Social capital theory 
suggest that insiders also benefit from their knowledge of 
and ties to other senior executives.  And a more homogenous 
top management team composed largely of insiders is likely 
to be more cohesive, communicate more frequently, and 
achieve higher levels of integration (Zenger & Lawrence, 
1989). 
Studies also document that the selection of an outsider 
CEO is often accompanied by high rates of senior 
management turnover (Helmich & Brown, 1972).  Thus, 
boards may fear that the selection of an outsider CEO could 
prompt an exodus of senior executives and a loss of 
management talent and knowledge (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; 
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Pfeffer, 1981).  In addition, boards often have difficulty 
evaluating outsider candidates, giving insiders, who are 
much more likely to be known quantities, a significant edge 
in succession decisions (Shen & Cannella, 2002). 
Given the preference for hiring insiders, much of the 
research on executive succession has examined when and 
why firms chose to deviate from this tendency and hire 
outsiders (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  Many studies 
have examined the role of firm performance as an antecedent 
to CEO succession decisions, and most, but not all, find that 
outsiders tend to be hired when firms are experiencing poor 
performance (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Dalton & Kesner, 
1985), when they are implementing turnaround strategies 
(Bibeault, 1982), or when poor performance is equated with 
the need for a change in strategy (Cannella & Lubatkin, 
1993).  Lucier and colleagues found that more than 80 
percent of the firms that hired outsiders as CEO were 
experiencing poor performance in the prior two years 
(Lucier et al., 2006).   
Arguments supporting these empirical findings are quite 
intuitive.  Outsiders are viewed as advantageous to firms 
suffering from poor performance because they are believed 
to be more likely to bring a new perspective.  The hiring of 
an insider, on the other hand, is viewed as part of a 
maintenance strategy and an attachment to the status quo 
(Helmich & Brown, 1972).  Thus, again, consistent with 
human and social capital arguments, boards face a paradox 
in selecting a CEO – insider candidates know the company 
and other executives, but may be unable to see the need (if it 
exists) for a change in strategy.  On the other hand, outsiders 
may see the need for a change in strategy, but could face 
significant challenges in implementing strategic changes 
because they lack knowledge of the firm and its industry and 
do not have established relationships with the firm’s senior 
executives (Bower, 2007; Fondas & Wiersema, 1997). 
 
The Influence of Leader Experience on Organizational 
Performance 
 
In her review of the executive succession literature, 
Karaevli (2007) notes its inconsistent findings and 
concludes:  1) that researchers need more refined measures 
of what it means to be an insider or an outsider, and 2) that 
researchers need to be more attentive to the contextual 
factors that moderate the relationship between managerial 
origin and performance.  Karaevli’s own research used a 
new measure of “outsiderness” based on the extent of CEO 
experience in both the firm and its industry, and she 
examined CEO successions only in the airline and chemical 
industries.  Her study concluded that CEO background has 
no main effects on firm performance, but that it does have 
significant moderating influences on performance. 
In an earlier review, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
highlight an important point made in an early study by 
Gamson and Scotch (1964) – that succession frequently 
follows a period of poor performance.  As a result, an 
improvement in performance is more likely to follow the 
succession event, regardless of whether an insider or an 
outsider is chosen to lead.  Thus, context matters a good 
deal, and succession studies that make use of panel design 
methodologies face the risk of being influenced by a 
regression to the mean phenomenon. 
Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992) studied the 
effect of CEO background in high-tech firms and found that 
performance improves following the hiring of either an 
insider or an outsider.  Perhaps firms competing in high-tech 
contexts benefit from the perspectives provided by any new 
CEO, regardless of background.  Another study of a wide 
range of industries showed near-term firm performance is 
nearly four times better when poor-performing firms hire an 
outsider to be CEO, but that insiders produced higher long-
term results (Lucier et al., 2006).  Other studies come to 
different conclusions, again depending on context.  Denis 
and Denis (1995) report, not surprisingly, that performance 
improves following the forced resignation of a CEO.  And, 
reflecting perhaps the regression to the mean phenomenon, 
Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) find that firm 
performance deteriorates in the years before CEO turnover 
and then improves, but that performance improvements are 
greater when the new CEO is an outsider. 
 
The Value of Executive Experience in Diversified Firms 
 
Because of their size and complexity, large diversified 
firms are a context in which human and social capital is 
likely to be especially valuable, abundant, and, because of its 
specificity, also very difficult to share or transfer (Prahalad 
& Bettis, 1986; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990).  Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1996) underscore that the executives of large 
diversified firms must manage not just a single business, but 
a portfolio of often quite varied businesses.  CEOs and other 
top executives of these firms must acquire a broad 
understanding of the product and geographic markets in 
which their firms’ businesses compete (Naveen, 2006), as 
well as knowledge of the different technologies and 
processes associated with the business units that make up 
their firms’ portfolios of businesses (Pehrsson, 2006; 
Piscitello, 2004). 
In addition to understanding their firms’ unique 
portfolios of individual businesses – their competitive 
situation, positioning within the competitive environment, 
resources and capabilities, and cash flow characteristics – 
executives leading diversified firms must also have detailed 
understandings of how these businesses are related to each 
other and how they together are a part of the larger 
diversified firm (Porter, 1987; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997).  
Based on these understandings, executives will develop 
elaborate mental models about how to derive synergies from 
their firms’ diversification strategy, which will also become 
manifested in organizational processes, procedures, and 
routines (Goold & Campbell, 1987). 
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For example, prior studies describe how diversified 
firms develop procedures to apply a common technology or 
set of technological capabilities across business or product 
lines (Miller, Fern, & Cardinal, 2007; Pehrsson, 2006; 
Piscitello, 2004).  Other studies shed light on how 
diversified firms develop functional skills and organizational 
processes that can be applied across all of their businesses, 
even when those businesses may lack common product or 
service characteristics (Mason & Harris, 2005; Porter, 1985, 
1987; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005).  Still other studies 
show how firms, often those pursuing unrelated 
diversification strategies, develop elaborate financial 
reporting procedures and resource allocation processes to 
promote the efficient functioning of internal capital markets 
(Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1975).  All of these approaches to 
deriving synergies require extensive firm-specific human 
capital that is likely to be difficult to acquire quickly or 
transfer easily. 
Effective management of a large diversified firm also 
requires significant social capital.  Moran (2005) emphasizes 
that social capital includes not only the configuration of 
social ties among key management personnel, but also the 
quality of those social ties.  While the configuration of 
interpersonal relationships refers to “the presence or absence 
of network ties between actors, along with other structural 
features like connectivity, centrality and hierarchy,” the 
quality of those relationships is a function of the level of 
“interpersonal trust and trustworthiness, overlapping 
identities, and feelings of closeness or interpersonal 
solidarity” (2005:  1,132).  Again, the diversified context is 
one in which higher levels of social capital are likely to be 
especially helpful in effectively managing the inherent 
complexity since social capital enhances communication 
among executives and managers.  Enhanced communication 
will facilitate the effective management of individual 
businesses, and it will also be essential to the efficient 
coordination of business units and efforts to derive synergies 
from those businesses. 
 
CEO Hiring Patterns in Large Diversified Firms 
Given the challenge of understanding both the 
complexity and the vast amount of firm-specific knowledge 
that are associated with the management of a large 
diversified firm, it seems plausible that these firms would be 
more likely to opt for insiders and those with more firm-
specific human and social capital when selecting their CEO.  
Stated formally: 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Large diversified firms are more 
likely to have insiders as CEO. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Large diversified firms are more 
likely to have individuals with more years of 
company experience as CEO. 
 
CEO Experience and the Performance of Large Diversified 
Firms 
Regardless of whether large diversified firms are more 
likely to select insiders or individuals with more years of 
company experience as their CEO, our theorizing suggests 
that performance will be higher in those large diversified 
firms that do.  Focusing on firms in a service industry, Kor 
and Leblebici (2005) note that outside executives are likely 
to offer their firm new and novel knowledge, while insiders 
are more likely to draw on their firm’s existing knowledge 
and capabilities.  But the findings of their study also 
highlight the difficulties outsiders experience when 
attempting to share and implement their new ideas and when 
attempting to assimilate their firms’ specialized knowledge 
and skills.  Given the elaborate routines, processes, and 
procedures that diversified firms will have in place to 
manage diversification, implement their corporate strategies, 
and derive synergies from their portfolio of businesses, 
insider executives who have obtained a sophisticated 
knowledge and understanding of these processes and 
procedures, as well as social and network ties and 
interpersonal trust, should be associated with higher firm 
performance (Zenger & Lawrence, 1989).  Applying these 
human and social capital arguments to the management of 
large diversified firms suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Large diversified firms that have an 
insider as their CEO will enjoy higher performance. 
 
Past studies have acknowledged that insider/outsider 
status is an overly simplistic dichotomy, and that it makes a 
good deal of difference whether an individual has no 
experience, two years, or 20 years of experience with a 
company prior to becoming a CEO (Karaevli, 2007).  Going 
beyond whether a CEO is an insider or an outsider, it is also 
reasonable to hypothesize that as executives spend more 
time at large diversified companies they will have more 
opportunities to acquire an in-depth understanding of their 
companies’ processes, procedures, routines, and other types 
of firm-specific knowledge and become fully knowledgeable 
of the social and network ties and relationships within these 
companies.  Thus, we would expect that less experienced 
executives will not be associated with high performance in 
large diversified companies, but that more experienced 
executives should be positively associated with performance 
outcomes.  One previous study has found that the CEOs of 
more diversified companies tend to be older and have more 
years of education than their counterparts in less diversified 
companies (Berry et al., 2006).  This finding also implies the 
importance of firm-specific human and social capital in 
successfully managing the organizational complexity 
associated with highly diversified firms.  Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The number of years an executive 
spends with a large diversified company before 
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becoming CEO will be positively associated with 
firm performance. 
 
SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
 
The sample was composed of 250 firms chosen 
randomly from the 2004 Fortune magazine’s “500 Largest 
Firms” in order to include firms that are both large and 
diversified in the study.  Of the initial set of 250 firms, we 
excluded 11 firms for which complete data were unavailable 
or were presented in an inconsistent format.  This resulted in 
a final sample for this study of 239 firms. 
Firm performance is measured using average return on 
assets (ROA) for the three years 2004 through 2006.  The 
use of ROA in this study is consistent with the performance 
measure used in many studies examining the influence of 
CEO background and experience.  ROA is less influenced 
by capital structure than ROE, and it is not as subject to the 
volatility that is present in market-based performance 
measures.  And, by using a three-year average, we minimize 
the impact of one-year swings in accounting performance 
that can be attributed to one-time factors.  Firm performance 
data were obtained from the Mergent Online database. 
We define insiders as CEOs who had tenures of two or 
more years with their company before their appointment as 
CEO (Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987; Datta & Guthrie, 1994; 
Davidson et al., 1990; Vancil, 1987). Outsiders were defined 
as CEOs who had less than two years experience with their 
company before their appointment as CEO.  Data on 
insider/outsider status were obtained from Dun and 
Bradstreet’s Handbook of Corporate Managements, 2004. 
To explore in a more detailed way the value of firm-
specific CEO experience (Karaevli, 2007), we include a 
measure of the number of years executives were with a 
company prior to becoming CEO.  This is equal to the 
natural logarithm of one plus the absolute number of years 
individuals were with a company before their appointment 
as CEO.  Data for this measure were obtained from Dun and 
Bradstreet’s Handbook of Corporate Managements, 2004. 
To examine the influence of size on the decision to 
select insiders and those with more firm-specific experience, 
and then later to control for the documented effect that firm 
size has on performance and a wide range of strategic 
decisions, we included the natural logarithm of the number 
of employees in 2004 in our statistical analyses.  Data on 
firm employment levels were obtained from the Fortune 
database. 
Diversification was assessed in 2004 using the 
continuous entropy measure of diversification (Palepu, 
1985).  This continuous measure uses SIC codes and 
business unit sales data to evaluate the extent of 
diversification, and tests of its validity have supported its use 
as a measure of diversification (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
Moesel, 1993).  Data to compute our diversification measure 
were obtained from Mergent Online. 
Industry profitability exerts a considerable influence on 
firm performance (Rumelt, 1991), so we control for industry 
effects by including a measure of industry profitability.  
Data on industry performance in 2004 were obtained from 
Fortune. 
We control for the length of time an individual has 
served as CEO and measure CEO tenure as of 2004.  Data 
were obtained from Dun and Bradstreet’s Handbook of 
Corporate Managements, 2004. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all of 
the variables included in the study can be obtained from the 
authors.  Hypothesis 1a suggested that large diversified firms 
would be more likely than smaller and less diversified firms 
to have insiders as CEO, and Hypothesis 1b proposed that 
large diversified firms would be more likely than smaller 
and less diversified firms to have executives with more firm-
specific experience.  Since the insider variable is 
dichotomous, we used Logit analysis to test Hypothesis 1a, 
and because the years with company variable is continuous, 
we used regression analysis to test Hypothesis 1b.  The 
results of these tests are summarized in Table 1.  Lending 
partial support to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we found the firm 
size variable to be significant and positively associated with 
the decision to have an insider CEO and a CEO with more 
years of firm-specific experience.  However, the 
diversification variable is not significantly associated with 
the decision to select an insider to be CEO and it is only 
modestly associated with hiring an individual with more 
years of firm-specific experience.  Thus, it appears that firm 
size is a more significant influence than the extent of 
diversification on the selection of insiders and executives 
with more firm-specific experience as CEO. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Are Large Diversified Firms More Likely to Have Insiders and Executives 
with More Years of Company-Specific Experience As Their CEO? 
 (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Dependent Variable:  
 Insider 
CEO 
 
 Years with 
Company 
 
Intercept -2.06
(1.28)
 .77
(.57)
 
Firm Size .27
(.13)
* .15
(.06)
** 
Firm Diversity .17
(.27)
 .20
(.16)
+ 
Chi-Square 
Likelihood Ratio 
 
5.43 +  
R-Square 
        
 .04  
F Statistic  5.4 ** 
 
N 239
 
239
 
+        p < .10 
*        p < .05  
**     p < .01 
***   p < .001 
 
Summaries of the results of regression analyses 
examining Hypotheses 2 and 3 are shown in Table 2.  Model 
1 summarizes the influence of the control variables on firm 
performance, showing that industry profitability and firm 
size are significant and positively associated with firm 
performance.  Model 2 examines the influence of these 
control variables and the insider CEO variable on firm 
performance.  Supporting Hypothesis 2, which proposed that 
firm performance will be higher when large diversified firms 
have insiders as CEO, the insider variable is both positive 
and significant.  Model 3 examined the influence of the 
control variables and the years with company variable on 
firm performance.  (CEO tenure is not included in this model 
due to its high correlation with the years with company 
variable.)  Providing strong support for Hypothesis 3, the 
years with the company variable is highly significant and 
positively associated with ROA. 
 
 
5
Stimpert et al.: The Insider's Advantage: CEO Experience and The Performance of La
Published by FHSU Scholars Repository, 2010
Stimpert, Chesley and Ostrowitz Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice and Teaching 
 2010, Vol. 6, 62-71 
 67
TABLE 2 
 
The Influence of Insider CEOs and CEOs with More 
Years of Firm-Specific Experience on Firm Performance 
(dependent variable in all models is ROA, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Intercept -6.53
(2.83)
* -6.55
(2.81)
* -6.54 
(2.78) 
* 
Industry 
Profitability 
 
1.32
(.13)
*** 1.35
(.13)
*** 1.31 
(.13) 
*** 
Firm Size .60
(.27)
* .50
(.27)
+ .46 
(.27) 
+ 
Firm Diversity 
 
-.02
(.57)
 -.05
(.57)
 -.15 
(.57) 
 
 
CEO Tenure 
 
.06
(.04)
 
.04
(.04)
   
 
Insider 
 
 
 
1.62
(.69)
 
* 
  
Years with 
Company 
  .84 
(.32) 
** 
 
R-Square 
        
.32
 
 .34
  
.34 
 
F Statistic 27.83 *** 23.81 *** 29.80 *** 
N 239  239  239  
+        p < .10 
*        p < .05  
**     p < .01  
***   p < .001 
 
To further explore the influence of insider/outsider 
status and years of firm-specific experience on firm 
performance outcomes in diversified firms, we conducted 
additional analyses examining performance differences 
across less and more diversified groups of firms.  We first 
divided our sample of 239 firms into two groups by the 
median level of diversification.  We then further divided 
these two groups into insider and outsider subgroups and 
calculated the mean ROA for these four subgroups as shown 
in Table 3. 
As summarized in Table 3, the distribution of firms 
shows only a slightly higher number of the more diversified 
firms are led by insiders than their less diversified 
counterparts, and similarly, only a slightly higher number of 
the less diversified firms are led by outsiders than their more 
diversified counterparts.  As predicted by the arguments 
summarized in this paper, however, the two subgroups of 
firms led by insiders enjoyed higher mean levels of ROA.  
And, as predicted, the subgroup of more diversified firms led 
by insider CEOs significantly outperforms the subgroup of 
more diversified firms led by outsider CEOs. 
Second, we subdivided our groups of firms into four 
subgroups based on the extent of diversification and the 
CEO’s years of firm-specific experience (as determined by 
the median values for diversification and the years with 
company variable).  We then calculated mean ROA for these 
four subgroups as shown in Table 4.  Again, the two 
subgroups of firms led by CEOs with more years of firm-
specific experience enjoy higher levels of mean ROA than 
their counterparts that are led by CEOs with fewer years of 
firm-specific experience.  Comparing the two more 
diversified subgroups of firms, those led by CEOs with more 
firm-specific experience significantly outperform the firms 
led by CEOs with fewer years of firm-specific experience. 
6
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TABLE 3 
 
Performance Differences in Less Diversified and 
More Diversified Firms Led by Insiders and Outsiders 
 
 Less Diversified More Diversified 
 
 
Insider 
 
N = 81 
Mean ROA = 5.53 
Variance = 46.16 
 
 
N = 85 
Mean ROA = 5.66 
Variance = 23.39 
 
 
Outsider 
 
N = 39 
Mean ROA = 4.52 
Variance = 40.90 
 
 
N = 34 
Mean ROA = 3.79 
Variance = 16.46 
  
ROA diff. = 1.02 
df = 80 
t-statistic = .80, n.s. 
 
 
ROA diff. = 1.87 
df = 72 
t-statistic = 2.15 * 
 
+        p < .10 
*        p < .05  
**     p < .01  
***   p < .001 
 
 
TABLE 4 
 
Performance Differences in Less Diversified and More Diversified Firms 
Led by CEOs with More and Less Years of Firm-Specific Experience 
 
 Less Diversified More Diversified 
 
More Years of 
Firm-Specific 
Experience  
 
N = 53 
Mean ROA = 5.99 
Variance = 59.02 
 
 
N = 65 
Mean ROA = 6.05 
Variance = 25.11 
 
Less Years of 
Firm-Specific 
Experience 
 
N = 67 
Mean ROA = 4.66 
Variance = 32.46 
 
 
N = 54 
Mean ROA = 3.61 
Variance = 15.78 
  
ROA diff. = 1.34 
df = 93 
t-statistic = 1.06, n.s. 
 
 
ROA diff. = 2.44 
df = 117 
t-statistic = 2.60 ** 
 
+        p < .10 
*        p < .05  
**     p < .01  
***   p < .001 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Contributions to Theory and Practice 
 
Though most strategy researchers would agree with 
Rumelt that “the critical resource of the modern, diversified, 
divisionalized firm is general management skill” (1974:  
156), previous research includes relatively few studies that 
have explicitly incorporated human variables in an effort to 
understand the antecedents of firm performance in large 
diversified firms.  For anyone who accepts the view that 
human and social capital is an important source of 
advantage, this study’s findings are unlikely to come as a 
surprise.  Yet, all too often management research tends to 
view the leadership of such firms as a “faceless abstraction” 
(Bettis & Prahalad, 1995:  6), and, aside from a few 
noteworthy exceptions (e.g., Michael & Hambrick, 1992; 
Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), the 
diversification and corporate strategy literatures have largely 
ignored the role of executives and top managers in 
formulating and implementing strategies and the importance 
of human and social capital as an influence on firm 
performance. 
Our study finds that large firms are more likely to select 
insiders and those with more years of company-specific 
experience as CEO.  On the other hand, we also find that 
more diversified firms are not more likely to select insiders 
and only somewhat more likely to select CEOs who have 
more years of firm-specific experience.  These results 
suggest it is the complexity associated with firm size rather 
than the extent of diversification that primarily drives the 
decision to select insiders and those with more years of firm-
specific experience to be CEO. 
Our study supports our hypothesis that large diversified 
firms will enjoy higher performance when they have insiders 
as CEO.  We also contribute to theory by suggesting a new, 
more refined measure of executive experience or 
background, the number of years of company-specific 
experience.  Prior studies of executive experience that have 
employed the insider/outsider dichotomy have 
acknowledged that it is fairly arbitrary in the way it 
distinguishes among executives who have had varying 
degrees of prior experience before becoming CEO (Karaevli, 
2007).  Our development and use of the years of experience 
variable highlights the importance of human and social 
capital in large diversified firms.  In addition, our finding 
that the number of years of company-specific experience is 
associated with higher firm performance suggests the 
importance of using this new measure and the insights that 
can be gained from it. 
Our findings also have significant practical value.  As 
boards develop succession plans and hire CEOs, they should 
be mindful of the firm-specific human and social capital 
possessed by company insiders and those with more 
company-specific experience.  The value of this human and 
social capital may be too easily taken for granted but, as our 
study illustrates, it is highly valuable and is associated with 
significantly higher performance.  Studies cited earlier in 
this paper suggest that boards may select an outsider CEO in 
response to poor performance, but many of these studies also 
indicate that this move may be a short-term expedient that 
will fail to insure longer-run success (Karlsson et al., 2008; 
Lucier et al., 2006). 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Previous studies have shown that firms have a tendency 
to hire outsiders during times of poor performance and that 
performance tends to improve following the hiring of an 
outsider CEO (although several researchers have suggested 
that this performance improvement may be unrelated to the 
choice of CEO and may, in fact, reflect a regression to the 
mean).  While we did not examine the relationships among 
prior firm performance, choice of CEO, and subsequent firm 
performance, a study pursuing this line of inquiry would be a 
logical follow-up to our research.  Similarly, it would be 
interesting to examine the performance consequences of 
hiring outsider CEOs who have prior experience in more 
diversified firms versus those who have either no or very 
little prior experience in diversified firms. 
Likewise, it would be interesting to know something 
about the tenures of insider and outsider CEOs.  For 
example, do insider CEOs have longer tenures than outsider 
CEOs and are outsider CEOs more likely to move on to 
leadership opportunities at other firms?  It would also be 
interesting to determine if discernable differences exist 
between the strategies adopted by insider and outsider CEOs 
of large diversified firms.  For example, it might be 
reasonable to hypothesize that outsider CEOs, in an effort to 
improve firm performance, are more likely to change their 
firms’ diversification strategies since they lack a 
commitment to their firms’ past strategies (Bigley & 
Wiersema, 2002; Wiersema, 1992).  One recent study 
examining how CEO background influences the relationship 
between strategic change and firm performance offers some 
interesting parallels with this study.  Zhang and Rajagopalan 
find that the long-run performance effects of major changes 
in strategy are enhanced when they are initiated by insider 
rather than outsider CEOs.  They conclude that insider CEOs 
enjoy higher long-run performance because “they are more 
likely to initiate and implement strategic changes that build 
upon existing organizational capabilities” (2010:  343). 
Another avenue for research that would have both 
theoretical and practical value would be to follow-up on 
Bower’s (2007) idea of developing individuals with the 
capacity to be “inside-outside” executives, or executives 
who have the intimate firm-specific knowledge of insiders 
and the perspective of outsiders.   We believe that executives 
are often too narrowly dichotomized as insiders linked to the 
status quo or as outsider change agents, when companies 
actually need CEOs who can simultaneously understand the 
importance of exploiting existing competencies while also 
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anticipating the changes their companies will need to make 
in order to develop and sustain competitive advantage in the 
future (Lublin, 2009; March 1991). 
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